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Understanding New Hampshire’s Rule 4.2 as Applied to 




Consider this scenario: an attorney represents a client in litigation 
against a corporation.  The attorney gets a call from an employee of that 
corporation and the employee says, “everything in your complaint is abso-
lutely correct.”  However excited the attorney is to speak with this person, 
the Rules of Professional Conduct constrain whom the attorney can talk to 
if a corporation is involved in the pending litigation.  In New Hampshire, 
any attorney can quickly find that Rule 4.2 prohibits contact with a repre-
sented party.1  But is this corporate employee a represented party?  Even 
after reading the comment to the rule and the sparse interpretive case law 
available in New Hampshire, the attorney would be unable to discern 
whether it is proper to speak with this person, who could possibly make or 
break his or her case.   
Uncertainty of the rule’s scope breeds remarkable consequences.  
Speaking with this corporate employee could give the attorney access to 
valuable information – information that may be otherwise unavailable.  A 
determination of improper contact, however, could disqualify the attorney 
as counsel in the pending matter, which could cause extreme hardship on 
the client.  With such dire consequences for violation of the rule, it is frus-
trating that New Hampshire’s Rule 4.2 is so difficult to apply.  
New Hampshire’s Rule 4.2 is unworkably vague.  The New Hampshire 
Supreme Court provides little direction as to who is a party under the rule 
when a corporation is a litigant.2  Currently, New Hampshire is in the proc-
  
*J.D. candidate Franklin Pierce Law Center 2005.    
1.  N.H. R. Prof. Conduct 4.2.  The text of the rule states: “In representing a client, a lawyer shall 
not communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be repre-
sented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is 
authorized by law to do so.” 
 2. This is of course, no fault of the New Hampshire Supreme Court.  The problem lies not in mul-
tiple cases with unclear guidance, but rather, very few cases which do not cover the multitude of issues 
that arise from the application of the rule to a corporate litigant. 
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ess of reviewing all of its Rules of Professional Conduct.3   A new Rule 4.2 
could take over two years for the New Hampshire Supreme Court to for-
mally adopt.  In the interim, New Hampshire practitioners are left with a 
Rule 4.2, which does not make sense and is difficult to apply.   
Courts throughout the country use various tests to define who is a party 
under Rule 4.2 when a corporation is involved in litigation. The New 
Hampshire Supreme Court, however, has yet to adopt a specific test.  This 
has a chilling effect on contact with employees and/or former employees of 
a corporation involved in litigation.  New Hampshire’s Rule 4.2 needs to 
be more clearly defined for practitioners so they can benefit from proper ex 
parte contact without fear of being disciplined.  Furthermore, the rule’s 
scope should be narrowly tailored to fulfill its purpose to protect the attor-
ney-client relationship.  In this sense, application of the rule to a corpora-
tion should be similar to application of the rule to individuals. 
This article clarifies New Hampshire’s Rule 4.2 in relation to corporate 
litigants and establishes a few basic concepts gleaned by reviewing differ-
ent jurisdictional interpretations of the rule.   This article begins with back-
ground information regarding Rule 4.2 followed by a brief explanation of 
both the 2001 version of the ABA Model Rule 4.2 and the New Hampshire 
Rule 4.2.4  In particular, this article focuses on the difference between the 
comments of each rule.  Next, this article surveys tests other jurisdictions 
have formulated to interpret the scope of Rule 4.2 as applied to corporate 
litigants and analyzes the likelihood of the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
adopting each test.  This article then examines the 2003 version of the 
ABA Model Rule 4.2 and explains the origin of the rule and the scope of 
this rule when applied to a corporate litigant.  The author then proposes a 
rule for New Hampshire that is easy to apply and narrowly tailored to ful-
fill its purpose.  This article concludes that New Hampshire should adopt 
  
 3. See NH Sup. Ct. Rule 51.  Rule 51 governs the procedure of revision of Court rules which pro-
vides for appointment of an Advisory Committee on Rules which could be made from the Committee 
on Professional Conduct and the New Hampshire Bar Association’s Committee on Evidence and Eth-
ics.  “All such committees shall channel recommended changes through the Advisory Committee on 
Rules and shall serve as its sub-committees for specific areas of rule-making.”  NH Sup. Ct. Rule 
51(B)(2).  
 4. This article will only focus on the application of the rule in the civil context and specifically 
within this context when a corporation is a litigant.  For a general overview of the rule’s application in 
the criminal context see Peter A. Joy & Kevin McMunigal, Anti-Contact Rule in Criminal Investiga-
tions, 16 Crim. Just. 44 (Winter 2002).  Basically, conduct in the criminal context such as police inter-
rogation or covert interrogation is permitted under Rule 4.2 or its equivalent in the Model Code as 
conduct which is “authorized by law.”  See also State v. Smart, 622 A.2d 1197 (N.H. 1993); U.S. v. 
Hammad, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988).         
2004 UNDERSTANDING NEW HAMPSHIRE'S RULE 4.2 207 
this modified version of the 2003 Model ABA Rule, which clarifies who is 
covered under the ambit of the rule when applied to corporate litigants.5        
II.   BACKGROUND 
Before turning to the substantive issues regarding Rule 4.2, also known 
as the no-contact rule, it is important to understand why the rule exists.  
The rule provides a framework for deciding what corporate employees are 
subject to the prohibitions in the rule.  When the rule is extended too far 
informal discovery and other important features of ex parte contact are shut 
off.  In addition, although adherence to the Rule of Professional Conduct is 
something to which all attorneys should strive, it is important to note what 
the consequences are for a violation.  Since New Hampshire lacks a devel-
oped body of case law on the issue, an examination of discipline in other 
jurisdictions helps illustrate the full range of discipline that could result 
from a violation of the no-contact rule.   
A.  Purposes of the No-Contact Rule 
The no-contact rule exists to ensure fairness during litigation.6  The 
rule protects clients’ interests and makes sure that an unscrupulous oppos-
ing attorney does not take advantage of the client.  The rule seeks to pro-
tect the attorney-client relationship by preventing unfair questioning by 
opposing counsel that could harm a client’s interests.7    Further, the rule 
strives to “prevent[ ] unprincipled attorneys from exploiting the disparity in 
legal skills between attorney[s] and lay people.”8  Some courts have also 
found that the rule encourages settlement by “channeling communications 
between lawyers accustomed to the negotiation process.”9  In the corporate 
context, the no-contact rule also protects the organization against disclo-
  
 5. In this article the term “no-contact rule” is used as a general term referring to any version of 
Rule 4.2 or its equivalent in the Model Code.  “NH Rule” refers to the current New Hampshire Rule 
4.2.  Each version of the ABA Model Rule (2001 or 2003) is designated as such where necessary.  
 6. See Niesig v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1032 (N.Y. 1990) (finding that DR 7-104(A)(1) “fun-
damentally embodies principles of fairness”); Wright  v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 567 
(Wash. 1984) (en banc) (finding that the reason for the rule is to prevent represented parties from being 
taken advantage of).   
 7. Messing v. Pres. & Fellows of Harvard College, 764 N.E.2d 825, 830 (Mass. 2002); Wright 691 
P.2d at 567 (finding that the presence of the party’s attorney “theoretically neutralizes” contact from an 
opposing attorney). 
 8. Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (quoting Papani-
colaou v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 720 F.Supp. 1080, 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). 
 9. Cram v.  Lamson & Sessions Co., 148 F.R.D. 259, 260 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (citing Polycast Tech. 
Corp., 129 F.R.D. at 625). 
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sure of information that could be detrimental to the corporation as an ad-
mission under evidentiary rules.10      
B.  Why Ex Parte Contact Is Important 
Ex parte contact, generally, is any one-sided contact that is “from one 
party only, usually without notice to or argument from the adverse party.”11  
In referring to ex parte contact in the context of Rule 4.2, this article con-
templates the situation where an attorney in a matter seeks to contact an 
individual connected with a corporation without notifying the corporation’s 
attorney either by way of deposition notice or by informal consent. 
There are several reasons why an attorney may not want to notify the 
opposing corporate counsel before interviewing a person.  The most obvi-
ous is the importance of informal discovery, which can limit discovery 
expenses.12  Furthermore, informal discovery also allows the attorney to 
evaluate information without preserving evidence that could prove unfa-
vorable.13  The New York Court of Appeals noted the importance of ex 
parte contact, stating that: 
Costly formal depositions that may deter litigants with limited re-
sources, or even somewhat less formal and costly interviews at-
tended by adversary counsel, are no substitute for such off-the- re-
cord private efforts to learn and assemble, rather than perpetuate, 
information.14  
In addition to the practical advantages of ex parte contact, informal 
contact is also beneficial when the person with information in a pending 
matter does not feel comfortable speaking in the presence of corporate 
counsel.15  The fear of contact with a corporation’s counsel is felt even 
  
 10. Sherman L. Cohen, The Organizational Client: Attorney-Client Privilege and the No-Contact 
Rule, 10 Geo. J. Leg. Ethics 739, 771 (1997) (quoting Catherine L. Schaefer, A Suggested Interpreta-
tion of Vermont’s DR 7-401(A)(1): The Employment Attorney’s Perspective on Contacting Employees 
of an Adverse Business Organization, 18 Vt. L. Rev. 95, 98 1993).  
 11. Black’s Law Dictionary 597 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West 1999). 
 12. See Cram, 148 F.R.D. at 261 (finding that resort to purely formal discovery could create in-
creased discovery disputes which would consume judicial resources); Polycast Tech. Corp., 129 F.R.D. 
621, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding that any shift away from informal discovery increases costs and 
reduces judicial efficiency); Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. § 100 (2000) (finding that 
requiring conversations through counsel is “often more expensive, delayed and inconvenient than direct 
communication.).   
 13. Theodore Y. Blumoff, Margaret Z. Johns & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Pretrial Discovery: The 
Development of Professional Judgment 39 (Michie Co. 1993). 
 14. Niesig, 558 N.E.2d at 1034. 
 15. Polycast Tech. Corp., 129 F.R.D. at 628 (finding that former employees with ties to the corpora-
tion may not come forward with damaging information if they knew they would have to do so with the 
corporation’s counsel present); Robert J. Lynn, CLE Presentation, Contact with Represented Parties 
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more by an individual still employed by the corporation for fear of losing 
his or her job.  The Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers cau-
tions that “employees may be unwilling to speak as freely or candidly at a 
deposition in the presence of the lawyers for their employer as in an infor-
mal, pretrial interview.”16  Important information may never be brought to 
light if an employee is too fearful to submit to formal deposition and the 
only way to access this information is through an informal interview.  In-
formal discovery is also essential for an attorney considering the merits of 
filing a lawsuit.17  
C.  Consequences for Violation of Rule 4.2 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has inherent and statutory power 
under RSA 311:8 to supervise the conduct of attorneys for the protection of 
the public and the maintenance of public confidence in the bar as a 
whole.18  The oath taken by an attorney upon admittance to the New 
Hampshire State Bar, as well as the New Hampshire Rules of Professional 
Conduct, “provide[s] concrete ethical guides by which an attorney can set 
his conduct.  Any violation thereof which tends to bring reproach on the 
legal profession can be ground for disciplinary action” by the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court.19 
Generally, violations of Rule 4.2 are handled on an individualized 
case-by-case basis by the court presiding over the matter.20  “Each case 
must be determined on its own facts and circumstances and a disciplinary 
measure adopted which is warranted thereby and designed to accomplish 
the ends sought by it.”21  Although some jurisdictions suppress evidence 
obtained by improper contact with an individual,22 New Hampshire does 
  
(April 15, 1999) (copy located at the Franklin Pierce Law Center Law Library) (noting examples where 
employees may be unwilling to discuss information in the presence of corporate counsel, such as 
claims of racial sexual, and age discrimination).  
 16. Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. §100 (2000). 
 17. Cram, 148 F.R.D. at 262 (finding that prohibiting ex parte communication with an opposing 
party’s former employees could encourage the filing of non-meritorious claims for the sole purpose of 
being able to use formal discovery to build a case).  
 18. In re Mussman's Case, 286 A.2d 614, 620 (N.H. 1971); In re Harrington's Case, 123 A.2d 396 
(N.H. 1956). 
 19. In re Mussman's Case, 286 A.2d at 620. 
 20. Id.   
 21. Id. 
 22. See Insituform of N. Am., Inc. v. Midwest Pipeliners, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 622 (S.D. Ohio 1991) 
(holding that federal courts, applying the disciplinary rule adopted by the state’s highest court, could 
allow suppression of evidence since the more drastic remedy of attorney disqualification was available 
to the judge); Hammad, 858 F.2d at 842 (rejecting the government’s argument to “remove suppression 
from the arsenal of remedies available to district judges confronted with ethical violations” and reason-
ing that district court judges will use discretion in determining whether to suppress evidence resulting 
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not provide suppression of evidence as a remedy when there is a finding of 
improper ex parte contact.23   
In State v. Decker, the New Hampshire Supreme Court refused to sup-
press the defendant’s confession because of an attorney’s alleged improper 
contact.24  In Decker, the defendant waived a right to counsel at a meeting 
with the police.25  The defendant alleged that the prosecutor violated Rule 
4.2 and that, because of the violation, his confession should be sup-
pressed.26  The New Hampshire Supreme Court declined to rule on 
whether there had been a violation of Rule 4.2.  Instead, the Court focused 
on the remedies for a violation of Rule 4.2 and concluded that there would 
be no suppression of the confession since the New Hampshire Rules of 
Professional Conduct are aimed at policing the conduct of attorneys, not at 
creating substantive rights on behalf of third parties.27   
It is unlikely that in New Hampshire, a violation of New Hampshire 
Rule 4.2 would result in suppression of the evidence obtained from that 
improper conduct.  Although Judge Lynn has noted that Rule 4.2 does not 
differentiate between the civil and the criminal context, some cases have 
suggested that there should be a difference in how the rule is applied in the 
civil and criminal context.28  The differences between civil and criminal 
evidentiary procedures may very well justify a difference in remedies of a 
violation of Rule 4.2.  The Decker Court declined to extend the substantive 
rights of a defendant to include the benefit of evidence suppression be-
cause criminal procedure is governed largely by Constitutional principles 
that protect a defendant’s right to counsel.  The civil arena, however, does 
not share these same protections.  Rule 4.2 is the only protection against 
improper contact by the opposing counsel.29   
  
from an ethical violation given that suppression of evidence “imposes a barrier between the finder of 
fact and the discovery of truth.”). 
 23. State v. Decker, 641 A.2d 226 (N.H. 1994). 
 24. Id. at 228. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 229. 
 27. Id. at 230.  In State v. Decker, the New Hampshire Supreme Court quoted from the Michigan 
Supreme Court Majority opinion in People v. Green which reasoned that the Code of Professional 
Responsibility did not confer constitutional or statutory rights on individuals but instead were designed 
to regulate the conduct of attorneys.  The Court in Green also noted that the admissibility of evidence 
was governed by constitutional principles and that the “[c]odes of professional conduct play no part in 
such decisions.”  People v. Green, 274 N.W.2d 448, 454 (Mich. 1979).   
 28. See Lynn, supra n. 15 (noting that although the rule does not differentiate between the criminal 
and civil context, case law has created different tests depending on the context of the underlying matter.  
Judge Lynn advises that although some courts differentiate between the civil and criminal arena in 
applying the rule, criminal cases interpreting Rule 4.2 may nevertheless be applicable in civil cases.).   
 29. Note, however, that Rule 4.2 does not prohibit the parties directly from speaking with one an-
other.  Thus, it is only the opposing person’s attorney that cannot contact them without permission from 
their own attorney.   
2004 UNDERSTANDING NEW HAMPSHIRE'S RULE 4.2 211 
Disbarment, the most extreme disciplinary measure, was imposed by 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court in In Re Mussman’s Case.30  Mussman 
represented the husband in a divorce case.  In addition to assisting in the 
fraudulent transfer of corporate assets, Mussman contacted the wife, who 
he knew was represented by counsel.31  Not only did Mussman improperly 
contact the wife; he also made her sign a letter terminating the representa-
tion of her attorney that he then had his secretary send out immediately.32  
Mussman then induced the wife to sign a stipulation which gave her no 
support or alimony.33  The wife testified that although she did want a reso-
lution of the divorce, she did not think she had a choice whether to sign the 
stipulation.34   
The New Hampshire Supreme Court did not specify whether it was the 
fraudulent transfer of property or the improper contact with the wife that 
justified the disbarment of Mussman.  Since the Court included this con-
duct in the opinion sanctioning disbarment, it likely influenced the decision 
to disbar Mussman.  Although it is unlikely that disbarment would result 
from improper contact with a represented party as prohibited in the New 
Hampshire rule, it is likely to be considered in conjunction with other vio-
lations to contribute to the determination of sanctions. 
State v. Decker and In Re Mussman’s Case are the only two discipli-
nary action cases decided by the New Hampshire Supreme Court that dis-
cuss the sanctions possible for a violation of the New Hamphire’s Rule 4.2.  
In other jurisdictions there are several other consequences for violation of 
the no-contact rule.  One of the most common forms of discipline is dis-
qualification of the attorney who made the improper contact.35  Other dis-
ciplinary measures include return of document or notes obtained by the 
improper to opposing counsel36 and monetary sanctions.37  
In addition to these consequences, the attorney could also subject him-
self to civil liability in a malpractice claim against him if the improper con-
  
 30. 286 A.2d 614 (1971) (interpreting the code DR 7-104(A), then in effect in New Hampshire). 
 31. Id. at 618. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Insituform 139 F.R.D. at 624 (finding that “the inherent power of federal courts to consider the 
ethical conduct of attorneys appearing before them and to sanction such conduct, including disqualify-
ing the attorney, has long been recognized.”); see also Preamble, ABA M. R. Prof. Conduct 
(2003)(violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct does not require disqualification of the attorney, 
but this may be a remedy based on the discretion of the presiding court.). 
 36. Pitts v. Roberts, 857 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Mo. 1993) (en banc). 
 37. Harlan v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1260 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that imposition of a $5,000 
sanction in medical malpractice suit against defense counsel for unauthorized ex parte communications 
with physician was not abuse of discretion, even though court had inherent power to impose more 
severe sanctions such as striking defendants’ answer or excluding testimony). 
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tact and discipline on the attorney materially impacts the client’s case.38  
Furthermore, attorneys in a class action suit may be disqualified, even if 
that is not the sanction imposed, if the court sees the ethical violation as 
affecting the attorney’s ability to represent the class.39   
III. RULE 4.2 – THE NO-CONTACT RULE 
The 2001 version of the American Bar Association Model Rule 4.2 
prohibits attorneys from contacting represented parties in a lawsuit:   
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the 
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be 
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has 
the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.40 
The rule limits who a lawyer can talk to while involved in litigation.  
First, the limitation only affects a lawyer who represents a client.  Second, 
the rule applies only to communications about the subject of the represen-
tation.41  Third, the rule only prohibits contact with a party the lawyer 
knows is represented by another lawyer.42  Thus, if a person is unrepre-
sented then the lawyer may properly contact that person.43        
While the no-contact rule is easily applied in the context of individu-
als, it can be difficult to identify the people who are party to a suit when a 
corporation is involved in litigation.44  It is unquestionable that the rule 
applies to corporations which, just as individuals, are “served by the rule’s 
  
 38. Preamble, ABA M. R. Prof. Conduct (2003) (although a violation of the Rule of Professional 
Conduct do not prove a malpractice action in itself, a malpractice action may result if the client’s suf-
fers as a result of the attorney’s conduct.  A violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct “may be 
evidence of [a] breach of the applicable standard of conduct.”).   
 39. See Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions vol. 3,  ch. 15 § 15.01, 15-4 
(McGraw-Hill 1992) (noting that in class action litigation courts have used corrective measures such as 
substitution of counsel to avoid delays in the litigation).  The application of the rule to class members is 
beyond the scope of this article.  The rule does not reference application to class members in a class 
action lawsuit.  See Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. § 99 (1998) cmt. 1 (The Restatement 
indicates that “once the proceeding has been certified as a class action, the members of the class are 
considered clients of the lawyer for the class; prior to certification, only those class members with 
whom the lawyer maintains a personal client-lawyer relationship are clients.”  
 40. ABA M. R. Prof. Conduct 4.2 (2001).   
 41. Id. at cmt. [1]. 
 42. Id. at cmt. [5]. 
 43. A lawyer’s conduct with respect to an unrepresented person is governed by Rule 4.3 which 
provides that the lawyer “shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested,” and that if there is 
any confusion as to whom the lawyer represents, this should be made clear to the unrepresented party.  
ABA M.R. Prof. Conduct 4.3 (2001). 
 44. Messing, 764 N.E.2d at 830; Niesig, 558 N.E.2d at 1033. 
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fundamental principles of fairness.”45  Thus, the difficulty is not in deter-
mining whether the rule applies to corporations, but rather, to whom within 
the corporation the rule applies.46  As the New York Court of Appeals rea-
soned, “unless some employees [of a corporation] are also considered par-
ties, corporations are effectively read out of the rule.”47  The key question, 
thus, is what corporate employees are covered under the rule?  “As a mat-
ter of substance, a Rule designed to protect the organization’s client-lawyer 
relationship should only apply to persons who are legally privy to that rela-
tionship.”48     
The 2001 version of the ABA Model Rule and its comments attempt to 
define the scope of the rule.  Rules and comments that are similar, how-
ever, have sparked significant differences in the interpretation of the scope 
of the rule by different jurisdictions.49  Determining how far the rule ex-
tends to employees of a corporation is a jurisdictional policy choice: the 
broader the definition of “person” as applied to corporations, the more pro-
tection afforded to corporations and the less leeway given to access poten-
tially important information.50   Most jurisdictions, including New Hamp-
shire, have adopted a rule similar to the 2001 version of the ABA Model 
Rule.  Except for New Hampshire, most states have also adopted the com-
ments accompanying the 2001 version of the ABA Rule.   
Comment four of the 2001 version of the ABA Rule identifies three 
categories of persons as parties under Rule 4.2 when a corporation is in-
volved in litigation: 
[1]  persons having managerial responsibility on behalf of the 
organization 
and with any other person, 
[2]  whose act or omission in connection with that matter may 
be imputed to the      
organization[,] . . . or 
  
 45. Niesig, 558 N.E.2d at 1033. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Carl A. Pierce, Variations on a Basic Theme: Revisiting the ABA’s Revision of Model Rule 
4.2(Part I), 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 121, 156 (2002) (In this three-part article Carl Pierce, an Associate Re-
porter for the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission, details the remarks he presented at the April 2002 sym-
posium on the American Bar Association’s Revised Model Rules of Professional Conduct.); see also 
Carl A. Pierce, Variations on a Basic Theme: Revisiting the ABA’s Revision of Model Rule 4.2(Part II), 
70 Tenn. L. Rev. 321 (2003); Carl A. Pierce, Variations on a Basic Theme: Revisiting the ABA’s Revi-
sion of Model Rule 4.2(Part III), 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 643 (2003).     
 49. See infra, Section V. 
 50. Niesig, 558 N.E.2d at 1033. 
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[3]  whose statement may constitute an admission on the part 
of the organization.51 
Many states base their interpretation of who is a party under the rule on 
comment four of the ABA Rule.52 
IV. THE NEW HAMPSHIRE RULE 4.2 
A. “Party” and the Current New Hampshire Rule 
Most other jurisdictions have concluded that the distinction between 
the words “party” or “person” does not affect the overall interpretation of 
Rule 4.2.53  New Hampshire, however, does draw a distinction between 
person and party.  In State v. Smart, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
seemed to suggest that the word party was restricted to named parties in 
litigation by stating that “[a]lthough the [Rules] [do] not define these 
terms, the rule appears to contemplate an adversarial relationship between 
litigants, whether in a criminal or a civil setting.”54  The effect of specify-
ing the limit of the word party in the rule indicates a restrictive view of 
how the rule should be applied.  This, combined with the holding in 
Decker against evidentiary suppression, seems to indicate that New Hamp-
shire interprets Rule 4.2 narrowly and does not wish to extend the reach of 
the rule very far. 
B.  The Comment to the New Hampshire Rule 
Despite the similarity in the language of the NH Rule and the 2001 
version of the ABA Rule, the interpretation of the NH Rule could be dra-
matically different than other jurisdictions because of differences in the 
New Hampshire comment to the rule.55  The comment to the NH Rule 
states: 
  
 51. ABA M. R. Prof. Conduct 4.2; see generally Samuel R. Miller & Angelo J. Calfo, Ex Parte 
Contact with Employees and Former Employees of a Corporate Adversary: Is it Ethical?, 42 Bus. Law. 
1053, 1055 (1987).   
 52. See infra, Section V. 
 53. See e.g. Messing,, 764 N.E.2d 825.  
 54. 622 A.2d at 1214 (brackets in original).   
 55. Note that “the New Hampshire Supreme Court has not adopted the ABA Model Code Com-
ments, the New Hampshire Comments, or the Committee Notes to Decisions, all of which are included 
in some hard-copy versions of the Rules. The Comments and Notes have not yet been updated to match 
the amended Rules.”  New Hampshire Bar Association Ethics Committee, Ethics Opinions & Practical 
Ethics Articles, A Note about Ethics Materials, http://www.nhbar.org/about2.asp?SectID=13&CatID 
=52&SID=IOBJFOIPP298UJ8XMVC8WFCWMZBIGWB3MAHNYI7EHDRUKSLK9M (last up-
dated Mar. 25, 2004).  Thus, as with most rules, comments do not have the force of law and rather are 
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The New Hampshire Committee has modified the official com-
ment to Rule 4.2 by eliminating the following language from the 
comment thoughts by the ABA in August of 1983: “This rule pro-
hibits communications by a lawyer . . . with any person whose act 
or omission in connection with that matter may be imputed to the 
organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose 
statement may constitute an admission on the part of the organiza-
tion.”56 
Thus, the only persons remaining as parties in a corporate context in 
New Hampshire, when compared with comment four of the 2001 version 
of the ABA Rule, are those having managerial responsibility on behalf of 
the organization.57  The remainder of only one category of persons, how-
ever, certainly does not clarify who in a corporation is covered under the 
ambit of the rule.  In fact, the reference to those having managerial respon-
sibility is just as ambiguous as the other categories of persons excluded in 
the New Hampshire comment to the rule.58   
The comment to the NH Rule also gives an example of the scope of the 
rule: 
[T]he New Hampshire Committee decided to adopt the comments 
originally proposed by the Kutak Commission in May of 1981. Us-
ing the example of taking a statement from the driver of a Titanic 
Oil gasoline truck involved in an accident, the committee felt there 
was nothing improper or unethical for plaintiff's counsel to take a 
statement from the driver even though counsel knew that Titanic 
Oil was represented by retained counsel.59   
   
Although this example purports to clarify the scope of the rule, the ex-
ample falls short of a clear scope since there are numerous applications of 
the rule to many different types of corporate employees.60   
  
only guidelines as to how the rule should be applied.  In New Hampshire, the comments to the Rules of 
Professional Conduct may not even be updated to match the current version of the rule so their use may 
be of even less valuable.  
 56. N.H. R. Prof. Conduct 4.2.   
 57. See supra, Section III. 
 58. Cohen, supra n. 10, at 771 (Noting that “having managerial responsibility” category of persons 
in the comment to the ABA Model Rule 4.2 is a broad concept which can extend to any corporate 
employee who supervise others or could also be limited to corporate employees who would fall into the 
control group of the organization.)  The Control Group Test is discussed in the next section.  
 59. NH Rule Prof. Conduct 4.2; note also that the comments are not binding and merely explain the 
main text of the rule.   
 60. See infra, Section V. 
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The New Hampshire Supreme Court has not yet interpreted the effect 
of the excluded comment.  It is possible that the exclusion could render 
cases interpreting the 2001 version of the ABA Rule with the full comment 
inapplicable to New Hampshire.  Thus, without knowing for certain what 
employees are parties under the NH Rule, ex parte contact with any mana-
gerial employee – current or former – could potentially expose a New 
Hampshire attorney to a professional conduct violation or other adverse 
consequence.  Other jurisdictions, however, have defined the type of em-
ployee to whom the no-contact rule extends.   
V.   JURISDICTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF RULE 4.261 
The text and comments of the 2001 version of the ABA Model Rule 
have sparked a significant amount of tests interpreting the scope of the rule 
applied to the corporate litigant.  Each jurisdictional test considers the text 
of the rule, the comments to the rule and the purpose of the rule.  While 
New Hampshire does not have the same comment as most states, the text 
of the rule, the part that is binding, is substantially similar to the rules in 
force in other jurisdictions.   
A.  The Control Group Test 
The control group test is the narrowest jurisdictional interpretation of 
the rule.  The control group test refers to those employees who control the 
actions of the company - the “top management persons who ha[ve] the 
responsibility of making final decisions.”62   Although the control group 
test “better serves the policy of promoting open access to relevant informa-
tion” the rule is under-inclusive in that it ignores the fact that non-
management employees can bind the corporation.63  Thus, the purpose of 
protecting a litigant from unfair reach by attorneys is not served.  Further-
more, by singling out only one category of corporate employees, the con-
trol group test does not come close to making the rule’s application to cor-
porations proximate to the application of the rule to individuals.    
Since the comment to the current NH Rule includes only the first class 
of persons from the comments of the 2001 version of the ABA Rule (man-
  
 61. The relevant Mode Code, DR-7-104(A)(1), is substantially similar to Mode Rule 4.2.  Therefore, 
an analysis of the differences between the rules is unnecessary.  See e.g. Cohen, supra n. 10, at 
771(finding the Model Rule “almost identical to that of DR 7-104(A)(1)”).       
 62. Fair Automotive Repair, Inc. v. Car-X Ser. Sys., Inc., 471 N.E.2d 554, 560 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 
1984). 
 63. Niesig, 558 N.E.2d at 1035. 
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aging agents of a corporation), this is most likely the rule to be adopted by 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court if the Court were to interpret the cur-
rent rule.  New Hampshire Superior Court Judge Lynn stated that “the 
commentary to the New Hampshire Rule 4.2 strongly suggests that the 
drafters of our rule intended to adopt the control group test.”64   
B.  The Blanket Test 
On the other end of the spectrum is the blanket test.  The blanket test 
includes all employees of a corporation as a party under Rule 4.2.  The 
biggest advantage of this rule is that it is clear and easy to apply.65  Propo-
nents of this test also reason that because the attorney-client privilege po-
tentially extends to all employees of a corporation, so too does the no-
contact rule.66  This approach has been criticized as being too broad.67  
Upjohn Company v. United States supports limitation of the privilege rule.  
Justice Rehnquist noted in Upjohn that “[t]he privilege only protects dis-
closure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying 
facts by those who communicated with the attorney.”68  Thus, the privilege 
rules do not necessarily govern contact with an employee of a corporate 
adversary – only the communication between the corporate attorney and its 
client.  In other words, the underlying factual information is always up for 
grabs.69   
Further, it is not mandatory that a state’s rules regarding privilege par-
allel its no-contact rule.70  In addition, one key difference between the 
privilege rules and the no-contact rule which weighs against the amalgama-
tion of the two rules is the fact that the attorney-client privilege can always 
be waived by the client, whereas the no-contact rule can never be waived 
by the client of a lawyer seeking ex parte contact.71  Therefore, basing in-
terpretation of the no-contact rule on a state’s privilege rules is ill advised.  
  
 64. Lynn, supra n. 15.  Although the current rule seems to indicate that the intention was for the 
control group test, this does not mean that this should be the rule that is adopted upon revision of the 
rules.  See infra, Section VII, C. 
 65. Niesig, 558 N.E.2d  at 1034 (noting that under the blanket rule, an attorney need never worry 
about whether contact with an employee of a corporate adversary is proper or not). 
 66. See e.g. Niesig, 558 N.E.2d at 1033.   
 67. Id. at 1034 (finding that the blanket test, though easy to apply, “exacts a high price in terms of 
other values” and is not essential to achieve the purpose of the rule).     
 68. 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). 
 69. See Lynn, supra n. 15 (finding that the attorney-client privilege does not “immunize from dis-
closure” any factual information that a client may have). 
 70. See Cohen, supra n. 10 (noting that the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers § 100 states 
that a broad privilege rule does not require a complete ban on contact with entity employees). 
 71. N.H.R. Evid. 502(b), (c) (Attorney-Client Privilege can be waived by a client); Lynn, supra n. 
15 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 4 F. 3d 1455, 1462 (9th Cir. 1993) which finds that since the no-
contact rule deals with the duties of the lawyer and not the rights of a client, the rule cannot be waived 
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Based on the example in the comment to the NH Rule, it is unlikely 
that the New Hampshire Supreme Court would adopt the blanket rule.  The 
comment’s example states that it would not be improper to contact an em-
ployee truck driver of a corporation involved in an accident even if the 
lawyer knew that the corporation was represented.  The blanket rule would 
not allow such contact.    
C.  Alter Ego or Imputation of the Action or Niesig Test    
Rejecting the control group test as too narrow and the blanket rule as 
too broad, the New York Court of Appeals adopted its own rule for the 
application of the no-contact rule in Niesig v. Team I.72  In Niesig, the New 
York Court of Appeals defined “party” to a lawsuit under the no-contact 
rule as those “corporate employees whose acts or omissions in the matter 
under inquiry are binding on the corporation (in effect, the corporation’s 
“alter egos”) or imputed to the corporation for purposes of its liability, or 
employees implementing the advice of counsel.”73 
The Niesig Court determined that its test directly furthers the interests 
protected by the rule.74  It crafted a rule that defined the boundaries of a 
“party” under the no-contact rule.  First, the Niesig Court addressed its 
concern of improper admissions on behalf of the corporation by including 
employees who have the power to bind the corporation.75  The Niesig 
Court considered these employees the alter egos of the corporation: “em-
ployees who are so closely identified with the interests of the corporate 
party as to be indistinguishable from it.”76  Second, the Court addressed the 
concern of protecting the attorney-client privilege by including employees 
who are responsible for effectuating the advice of counsel as a party.77  
Third, the Court also included as a party under the no-contact rule “any 
member of the organization whose own interests are directly at stake in a 
representation.”78  The rule as interpreted by the Niesig Court allows ac-
cess to employees who are merely witnesses of the subject of the litigation.  
The Niesig Court notes that this test strikes the proper balance between 
  
by the client.  Judge Lynn also notes that under the no-contact rule, only the attorney representing a 
client can authorize another attorney to speak with his client in his absence.  This comports with one of 
the purposes of the rule – to prevent interference with the attorney-client relationship.  If an attorney 
consents to the contact with his client, then presumably, there will be no interference with the attorney-
client relationship.).     
 72. 558 N.E.2d 1030 (N.Y. 1990). 
 73. 558 N.E.2d at 1035. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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protection of the corporation and access to information, and also notes that 
the test should prove clear in application.79    
D.  Binding Admissions or Managing/Speaking Test 
Similar to the control group test, the binding admissions test concludes 
that employees who have the power to bind the corporation by their state-
ments are parties under the no-contact rule.  In Wright v. Group Health 
Hospital, the Washington Supreme Court held that employees of the de-
fendant hospital were covered under the rule if “they ha[d] managing au-
thority sufficient to give them the right to speak for, and bind, the corpora-
tion.”80  Under this test, managerial employees are covered by the rule but 
employees who participate in the subject of the litigation or have signifi-
cant information are not covered.  Because this test excludes corporate 
employees who participate in the subject matter of the litigation, this rule is 
criticized as being too narrow.81   
E.  Balancing Test   
Some jurisdictions have attempted to promote fairness by creating a 
balancing test in interpreting the no-contact rule.82  These jurisdictions 
weigh the interest of the corporate defendant to keep privileged informa-
tion private against the need of plaintiff’s counsel to discover relevant in-
formation; the subject matter of the ex parte interview is also considered.83  
Proponents of this test reason that interests of informal discovery and pro-
tection of the corporation can only be effectively weighed on a case-by-
case basis with attention to the particular facts of the case.84  
VI. FORMER EMPLOYEES AND RULE 4.2 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has not had occasion to decide 
whether former employees of a corporate party are subject to Rule 4.2.  
Most other jurisdictions, however, conclude that Rule 4.2 does not apply to 
  
 79. Id. at 1036. 
 80. 691 P.2d at 569.   
 81. Sophie Hager Hume, Niesig v. Team I: Permitting Ex Parte Communication with Corporate 
Employees, 57 Brook. L. Rev. 953, 983 (1991). 
 82. Morrison v. Brandeis U., 125 F.R.D. 14 (D. Mass. 1989); Monahan v. Johnson, 128 F.R.D. 659 
(N.D. Ill. 1989); see generally, Merrick T. Rossein, Employment Discrimination Law and Litigation § 
14.51. 
 83. See Miller, supra n. 51, at 1069-70. 
 84. Morrison, 125 F.R.D. at 18. 
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former employees of a corporate party.85  Further, Judge Lynn noted that 
the current trend is that the no-contact rule does not apply to former em-
ployees of a corporate adversary.86  The Wright Court held that former 
employees cannot bind the corporation so the no-contact rule does not ap-
ply to any former employee.87  Similarly, the Niesig Court also decided the 
no-contact rule did not apply to former employees of a corporate adver-
sary.88  In addition, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility issued a formal opinion stating that “the prohibition of Rule 
4.2 with respect to contacts by a lawyer with employees of an opposing 
corporate party does not extend to former employees of that party.”89  The 
committee reasoned that neither the rule nor its comments provide a basis 
to expand the rule to former employees and thus, the rule should not be 
extended to include former employees.90  Further, the Restatement refers to 
only current employees or agents of a represented organization in its defi-
nition of a represented non-client.91  In Porter v. Arco Metals Company, 
however, the court held that ex parte contact is prohibited with current and 
former employees with managerial responsibilities concerning the litiga-
tion.92     
The current NH Rule 4.2 does not specifically state in either the text of 
the rule or its comment that an attorney may contact a former corporate 
employee without permission from corporate counsel or by formal deposi-
tion.  Nonetheless, it is probably safe to assume that such conduct is proper 
based on the overwhelming majority of opinion that contact with former 
employees of a corporate adversary is proper under the no-contact rule.  
There is nothing in the text or comment to the current NH Rule to suggest 
otherwise. 
An attorney cannot, however, discuss any and all matters with a former 
employee of a corporate adversary during an ex parte interview.  In In re 
  
 85. Cram, 148 F.R.D. at 262 (noting that courts generally find that attorneys are not prohibited from 
contacting former employees of a corporate adversary by the no-contact rule); See also Miller, supra n. 
51, at 1072; Bernard H. Dempsey, Jr., New Developments in the Law: Ex Parte Communications with 
Former Employees of a Corporate Defendant, 71 Fla. B.J. 10 (1997) (explaining the  case, H.B.A. 
Management, Inc. v. Estate of Schwartz 693 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1997) which defined in Florida that attor-
neys are not prohibited from contacting ex parte even former managerial employees of a corporate 
defendant and which agreed with the Florida Bar Ethics Committee Opinion that stated “a former 
manager or other employee who has not maintained ties to the corporation (as a litigation consultant, 
for example) is no longer part of the corporate entity and therefore is not subject to the control or au-
thority of the corporation’s attorney”). 
 86. Lynn, supra n. 15. 
 87. 691 P.2d at 569.   
 88. 558 N.E.2d at 1032. 
 89. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof. Resp., Formal Op. 91-359 (1991). 
 90. Id.   
 91. Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. § 100. 
 92. 642 F.Supp. 1116, 1118 (D. Mont. 1986). 
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Home Shopping Network, Inc. Securities Litigation the defendant corpora-
tion expressed concern that an ex parte interview with former employees 
could inadvertently allow the plaintiff access to attorney-client or trade-
secret information.93  The corporate counsel did not claim that the plain-
tiff’s attorney would intentionally seek privileged information but rather 
claimed that this information may inadvertently be disclosed during the 
interview if corporate counsel was not present at the interview.94  The 
court, relying on Porter and Upjohn, concluded that a protective order de-
nying ex parte contact was unnecessary to prevent disclosure.  As a cau-
tionary measure, the court ordered the plaintiff’s attorney to disclose cer-
tain information to the former employee, in writing if the interview was in 
person or orally if the interview was by telephone.95  The disclosure fol-
lows: 
a. The attorney/client privilege belongs to HSN and may not be 
waived by the employee. Former employees of HSN are prohibited 
from discussing any attorney/client communications belonging to 
HSN. This includes any privileged communications or contacts the 
former employee has had with any attorney for HSN, including 
anyone in HSN’s legal department. You are reminded not to dis-
close such information. 
b. As a former employee of HSN you may have executed a confi-
dentiality agreement with HSN regarding its trade secrets and you 
may be bound to the terms set forth in that agreement. 96 
The court further ordered that “plaintiffs’ counsel was not entitled to 
inquire into any attorney- client privileged communications” and cautioned 
that the attorney should immediately cease discussion of this information if 
it became apparent that privileged information was  offered by the former 
employee.97 
Although New Hampshire courts do not consider this case binding 
precedent, New Hampshire attorneys, should be concerned.  It is prudent 
for any attorney to be cautious when questioning a former employee of a 
corporate adversary to ensure that she is not discussing privileged informa-
tion or interfering with a contractual obligation.   
  
 93. 1989 WL 201085 at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 22, 1989).     
 94. Id. at n. 2. 
 95. Id. at *1. 
 96. Id. at **1-2. 
 97. Id. at *2. 
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VII. THE 2003 VERSION OF THE ABA MODEL RULE 4.298 
Currently, no state has adopted the 2003 version of the ABA Model 
Rule 4.2.  This should change as courts review and revise their rules be-
cause the new rule and its comments clarify many areas of uncertainty.  
The 2003 version of the ABA Model Rule and its comments basically 
adopt the Niesig test and the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers regarding the scope of the rule.99   
A.  The Changes to the Text of the Rule 
The text of the rule is not drastically changed.  The main text of the 
2003 version of the ABA Model Rule 4.2differs from the current Model 
Rule by allowing an attorney to obtain a court order to speak with a repre-
sented person.100  A new comment explains the reasoning for this addition:   
A lawyer who is uncertain whether a communication with a repre-
sented person is permissible may seek a court order.  A lawyer 
may also seek a court order in exceptional circumstances to author-
ize communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this 
Rule, for example, where communication with a person repre-
sented by counsel is necessary to avoid reasonably certain in-
jury.101 
Inclusion of the optional court order is positive, but does not solve 
every problem associated with the rule because the scope of the rule re-
mains unclear.  Thus, many of the benefits from ex parte contact are not 
fostered.  In other words, allowance of a court order may help an attorney 
avoid a violation of the rule, but it does not encourage low-cost informal 
discovery nor does it protect a current employee’s identity from his em-
ployer.   
B.  Changes to the Comments of the Rule 
The comments to the 2003 version of the ABA Model Rule 4.2 did 
change, especially comment seven dealing with contact with a represented 
organization.102  The reporter’s notes indicate that the change was in re-
sponse to criticism that the former comment was too vague and over-
  
 98. See generally Pierce, supra n. 48 (Parts I, II, and III). 
 99. See supra, Section V, C. 
 100. ABA M. R. Prof. Conduct 4.2 (2003) (Reporter’s notes). 
 101. ABA M. R. Prof. Conduct 4.2, cmt. 6. 
 102. ABA M. R. Prof. Conduct 4.2, cmt. 7. 
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broad.103  The new comment clarifies who is a party under the new rule.  
Comment seven states that the rule prohibits communication:  
With a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or 
regularly consults with the organization’s lawyer concerning the 
matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to 
the matter or whose act or omission in connection with the matter 
may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or crimi-
nal liability.  Consent of the organization’s lawyer is not required 
for communication with a former constituent.104  
There are three key differences between comment seven of the 2003 
version of the ABA Model Rule and comment four of the 2001 version of 
the ABA Model Rule.  First, comment seven uses the word constituent.  
Second, comment seven includes a category for employees who regularly 
consult with the organization’s lawyer.  Third, comment seven expressly 
excludes former employees from the scope of the rule.  Each of these 
changes clarifies the scope of the rule as applied to a corporate litigant.  
The use of the word constituent refers to those people who have a legal 
relationship with the organization and thus incorporates the majority view 
that former employees are not covered under the scope of the rule.105  Con-
stituent is also used in Model Rule 1.13 and refers to corporate directors, 
officers, employees, shareholders.106  Thus, use of the term constituent 
provides attorneys with more meaningful guidance as to what types of em-
ployees are covered under the rule. 
Inclusion of employees who consult regularly with the organization’s 
lawyer is an improvement and “replaces the broad and ambiguous refer-
ence in Comment [4] to ‘persons having managerial responsibility on be-
half of the organization.”107  Inclusion of this category of employees is 
important because it includes those employees who resemble the tradi-
tional client in the attorney-client relationship.  As discussed in Niesig, 
inclusion of these employees is essential to achieve the purpose of the rule 
to protect the attorney-client relationship.108    
Finally, the explicit statement in comment seven of the 2003 version of 
the ABA Model Rule that former constituents are not covered under the 
rule is a definite improvement from comment four of the 2001 version of 
  
 103. ABA M. R. Prof. Conduct 4.2 (Reporter’s notes); see also Pierce (Part I), supra n. 48, at 153 
(finding that comment seven is especially important since “most of the controversy surrounding the no-
contact rule relates to its application to represented organizations”). 
 104. ABA M. R. Prof. Conduct 4.2, cmt. 7. 
 105. Pierce (Part I), supra n. 48, at 155. 
 106. ABA M.R. Prof. Conduct 1.13. 
 107. Pierce (Part I), supra n. 48, at 156. 
 108. See supra, Section V, C.  
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the ABA Model Rule.  Exclusion of former employees from the scope of 
the rule is consistent with the majority view of courts that have had occa-
sion to interpret the rule with respect to former employees, with the Re-
statement’s position, and with the ABA’s Formal Opinion.109 
C. Proposed Rule for New Hampshire 
New Hampshire needs a Rule 4.2 that incorporates comment seven of 
the 2003 version of the ABA Model Rule into the text of the rule and in-
cludes key tenants of similar rules that have been analyzed by courts 
throughout the country.  As shown, the current text of the no-contact rule is 
susceptible to many interpretations.  Susceptibility to several interpreta-
tions is not negative if the jurisdiction in which an attorney practices has 
sufficient case law to clarify the scope of the rule.  In jurisdictions like 
New Hampshire, however, the Court provides no clear guidance for practi-
tioners to apply the rule.  This is unsettling because the lack of guidance 
either causes attorneys to be overly-cautious, or it causes an unsuspecting 
attorney to violate the rule out of ignorance.  In either circumstance, the 
vagueness of the current rule constrains an attorney’s ability to efficiently 
advocate for his or her client. 
The scope of the current Rule 4.2 is not clear.  Since New Hampshire 
is reviewing its Rules of Professional Conduct, it should take a serious 
look at Rule 4.2.  In so doing, the New Hampshire Supreme Court should 
note the troubling issue of the rule’s scope, which is deeply imbedded in 
the rule and is difficult to interpret by attorneys.  Although ambiguity in 
rules is sometimes favorable to afford the court adequate leeway to decide 
cases on an individualized basis, such a goal is not proper when applied to 
ethical rules that shape the conduct of a state’s bar.  The rules provide the 
framework for the ethical practice of law.110  The Rules of Professional 
Conduct are intended to guide lawyers’ conduct.  If those rules are them-
selves ambiguous or difficult to apply, then the purposes of the rules are 
not met. 
When New Hampshire revises its ethical rules, the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court should adopt a no-contact rule that is easy for attorneys to 
understand and apply.  The text of the rule should explicitly advise New 
Hampshire attorneys of the intricacies of the rules that have been debated 
and analyzed by courts throughout the country.  With a clear rule in hand, 
New Hampshire attorneys can vigorously advocate for their clients while 
also respecting the Rules of Professional Conduct.  
  
 109. See supra, Section VI. 
 110. Preamble, ABA M. R. Prof. Conduct (2003). 
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Merely adopting the 2003 version of the ABA Model Rule and its 
comments, however, is not enough to provide clear guidance about its 
scope for attorneys.  While the comments are much improved from the 
2001 version of the ABA Model Rule,111 a comment is not afforded the 
same weight as the text of the rule itself.  Thus, although comment seven 
of the 2003 version of ABA Rule 4.2 is a good step, adopting the comment 
does not go far enough.  In order to clarify the rule for practitioners, the 
intricacies imbedded in the rule’s scope need to be addressed in the text of 
the rule itself.112  “The primary reason for considering such a change is that 
the application of the Rule to represented organizations is such an impor-
tant and frequently recurring issue that it should be addressed both more 
authoritatively and more visibly.”113  Only then can practitioners under-
stand the rule and thus, can conform to it. 
Therefore, the following is a proposition for New Hampshire’s Rule 
4.2 which incorporates comment seven of the 2003 version of the ABA 
Model Rule into the text of the Rule and includes key tenants of the rule 
that have been analyzed by courts throughout the country: 
(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about 
the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to 
be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless: 
1. the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer; or  
2.  is authorized to do so by law; or  
3. the lawyer has obtained a court order permitting contact 
with the desired person.   
(b) In the case of a represented organization, an attorney shall not 
communicate about the subject of the representation with the fol-
lowing constituents of that organization: 
1. Current employees or agents of the organization who su-
pervise, direct or regularly consult with the organization’s law-
yer; or 
2. Current employees or agents of the organization who have 
authority to obligate the organization regarding the matter; or 
  
 111. Comment seven makes it much more clear who an attorney may or may not contact in a corpora-
tion. 
 112. See Pierce (Part I), supra n. 48, at 153 (noting that when states look at the 2003 rule, states 
should consider whether the comment regarding represented organizations should be addressed in the 
text of the rule instead). 
 113. Id. 
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3. Current employees or agents whose acts regarding the mat-
ter could impute the organization for purposes of civil or crim-
inal liability.114  
 
This rule addresses every concern that has been litigated in other juris-
dictions in a way that is clear and easy to apply without much need for 
judicial interpretation.  Further, the rule considers the types of corporate 
employees involved in a corporation and only includes those corporate 
employees whose connection with the litigation or corporation make appli-
cation of the rule to the represented corporation most like application of the 
rule to the represented individual.   
First, reference to only current employees or agents of an organization 
in the rule reflects the majority rule in other jurisdictions interpreting the 
2001 version of the ABA Model Rule and Model Code.115  This is a bright 
line rule that attorneys can easily apply and is not overbroad since the con-
sensus among jurisdictions is that the purpose of the rule is not served by 
inclusion of former employees or agents of a corporation.   
Second, by clearly identifying those employees or agents that fall un-
der the ambit of the rule, the above rule makes it easy for an attorney to 
decide whether contact with a particular person within the corporation is 
proper.116  The three categories of corporate constituents, taken directly 
from comment seven of the 2003 version of the ABA Model Rule, list only 
those people that the goals of the rule were designed to protect in a corpo-
ration.  Inclusion of only these three categories of persons strikes the 
proper balance between protection of the corporation and disclosure of 
relevant information.  As discussed in Niesig, only those employees of a 
corporate litigant who are so intertwined with the corporation should be 
covered by the rule since the primary purpose of the rule is to protect the 
  
 114. See also id. at 154 (Carl Pierce suggests a similar rule that does not include reference to only 
current employees.  In New Hampshire, there is no case law that holds that former employees are not 
included under the scope of the rule.  For this reason, inclusion of only current employees is important 
in the text of the rule to clarify for practitioners that the category of former employees is not included 
under the scope of the rule.  Another option is to state in the comment to the rule that former employees 
are not included under the scope of the rule.  Carl Pierce’s proposed rule also differs from the proposed 
rule here in that his proposed rule refers to “constituents of the organization” whereas the rule proposed 
in this article references “employees or agents of the organization.”  The main reason why I propose 
use of “employees or agents of the organization” is to provide clarity to practitioners.  Since New 
Hampshire lacks case law to define what a constituent of an organization means, reference to “employ-
ees or agents” is more readily understandable by practitioners.).    
 115. See supra, Section VI. 
 116. Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. § 100; Pierce supra n. 48, at 156 (Part I) (finding 
that the Ethics 2000 Commission intended that agents of a corporation should also be considered under 
Rule 4.2). 
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attorney-client relationship.117  Thus, those corporate employees who regu-
larly consult with the corporation’s attorney would be covered under the 
rule since they are part of the attorney-client relationship.  Such employees 
or agents “clearly personify the organization for the purposes of the no-
contact rule.”118  This category of covered corporate employees may have 
differing levels of responsibility in the corporation.  Comment c of the 
Restatement provides an example:  
[A] corporate vice president dealing with a patent counsel on a 
patent challenge, a corporate clerk assigned to collect documents 
for the lawyer, or a production employee providing expert infor-
mation to the lawyer about a mechanical process that is in issue.  
On the other hand, agents and others (including managerial em-
ployees) who are not within the definition . . . may be contacted 
without consent regardless of their position in the organization.119     
 
The Restatement also provides an illustration of how the effect of regu-
lar consultation with the corporation’s counsel renders that employee off-
limits with regard to the no-contact rule: 
Manager heads the transportation department of Corporation, 
which is defending against a claim for personal injuries by Plain-
tiff.  Plaintiff, represented by Lawyer A, seeks damages resulting 
from a traffic accident allegedly caused by Corporation’s negli-
gence in hiring Driver who had a bad driving record.  Lawyer A 
knows that Corporation is represented by Lawyer B in defending 
against the claim.  Manager has power to authorize settlement of 
the matter with Plaintiff on behalf of Corporation.  Lawyer A may 
not contact Manager except with the consent of Lawyer B . . . .120  
Thus, employees who carry out the advice of the corporate attorney are 
also most like the traditional client and should be clearly identified in the 
rule as people who should not be contacted if the organization is repre-
sented by counsel.   
Current employees or agents of the organization who have authority to 
obligate the organization regarding the matter are akin to the individual 
client because corporations are legal entities that can only act through indi-
  
 117. See supra, Section V, C. 
 118. Pierce supra n. 48, at 157 (Part I).  
 119. Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. § 100 illus. 1.  
 120. Id.  (The Restatement also notes that if the manager was not authorized to settle the case and was 
not responsible for the hiring of the driver, then contact would be not be improper.).  
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viduals.121  These corporate individuals are individuals who could bind the 
corporation in an evidentiary sense.  Including these employees is impor-
tant because it allows application of the rule in a manner as close as possi-
ble to that of the traditional attorney-client relationship involving an attor-
ney and an individual person.  Obviously, an attorney cannot contact a 
represented individual litigant ex parte who could make a statement that 
could harm that individual’s case.  Inclusion of those corporate employees 
that could similarly bind the corporation allows the same application and 
protection of principles when a corporation is a litigant.122   
Current employees or agents whose acts regarding the matter could 
impute the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability should be 
included in the rule because “the organization’s need for legal representa-
tion arises because of the constituent’s conduct.”123  The Restatement indi-
cates that this category of persons should be included in the rule because 
absent the corporate link, the individual would be directly named as a party 
to the litigation.124  Since corporations act only through individuals, when 
an individual acts for the corporation, that person should be considered 
under the scope of the rule.   
In the Restatement’s example, Attorney A’s contact with the driver of 
the vehicle would be improper.125  This comports with the policy of apply-
ing the rule to corporations as close as possible to applying the rule to indi-
viduals.  Thus, when individuals act on behalf of the corporation, this is as 
close as the individual client acting on his own behalf.  Thus, this person is 
not merely a witness to the underlying litigation but instead was the actor 
(or person acted upon) giving rise to the litigation.126    
  
 121. See supra, Section V, D.  One of the main criticisms of the binding admissions test was that it 
only applied to managerial employees who could bind the corporation.  By broadening the definition to 
include any employee who would bind the corporation in an evidentiary sense regarding the legal 
matter, the criticism that the rule is too narrow is addressed.  The rule is not overbroad either since it 
only includes employees who could bind the company with regard to the matter; thus the overbreadth 
criticism of the blanket rule is also addressed. See supra, Section V, B. 
 122. Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. § 100 (The Restatement does not provide an exam-
ple of how this is applied: however, the Restatement notes that “such a person is analogous to a person 
who possesses power to settle.”  Thus, if the individual’s admission would bind the company, as would 
an agreement to settle the litigation, then ex parte contact with this individual is improper.). 
 123. Pierce supra n. 48, at 168 (Part I). 
 124. Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. § 100. 
 125. See supra n. 109 (The Restatement also notes that if Lawyer A wanted to contact the mechanic 
of the vehicle, this contact would also be improper if the mechanic was an employee of the corpora-
tion).      
 126. Note also that the individual whose act is imputed on the organization may retain his own coun-
sel if his interests conflict with the interests of the corporation such that the corporation’s attorney 
could not also represent the individual under Rule 1.13.  If this individual retained his own attorney, 
consent to talk to this individual would need to be obtained from the individual’s attorney and consent 
from company’s attorney would be unnecessary.   
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VIII.   CONCLUSION 
New Hampshire’s no-contact rule is currently too vague to give New 
Hampshire attorneys any meaningful guidance.  Although the comment 
purports to define the scope of the rule, the comment does not address the 
many different tests that have developed in application of the no-contact 
rule to the corporate litigant.  Also, the comment is not binding and thus 
attorneys cannot be sure that contacting any employee of a corporate liti-
gant would be proper under the rule.   
The benefits of ex parte contact are substantial.  Ex parte contact al-
lows for discovery of information that may not be gained otherwise or at 
the very least, allows an inexpensive means to discover relevant informa-
tion.  The consequences of improper ex parte contact are significant 
enough that attorneys are deterred from making contact for fear of doing so 
improperly.  This combination of the importance of ex parte contact and 
the negative consequences for improper contact warrant a no-contact rule 
that is clear and easy for the New Hampshire attorney to understand.  The 
purpose of the rule similarly requires that the rule be clear to attorneys.  A 
rule that is vague and shields valuable information does not serve the rule’s 
purpose.  The rule is meant to protect the attorney-client relationship, not 
as a barrier to the discovery process.  Yet, when the rule is vague, this is 
exactly what happens. 
Other jurisdictions have had an opportunity to define the rule so that its 
application is clear.  New Hampshire has not had this opportunity so appli-
cation of the rule here remains uncertain.  The tests applied in other juris-
dictions, however, clarify certain aspects of the rule.  Employees of a cor-
poration that can bind the company are akin to individual clients who can 
harm his or her case by speaking with the opposing counsel.  This should 
be the same for the corporate litigant who deserves no better nor no worse 
protection by the rule. Employees who regularly consult with the corporate 
attorney should similarly be considered under the scope of the rule since 
they are most like an individual consulting with his or her attorney. 
The 2003 version of the ABA Model Rule and comment seven strike a 
fair balance of interests to the corporate litigant by only including those 
employees who maintain the roles traditionally held by a client in the at-
torney-client relationship.  The 2003 version of the ABA Model Rule does 
not go far enough because this explanation of the scope of the rule as ap-
plied to the corporate litigant is only in a comment to the rule.  As evi-
denced by the many different tests in other jurisdictions, the text of the rule 
is not clear on its face and thus needs to be clarified by including the com-
ment in the text of the rule.  This is especially necessary in New Hamp-
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shire where there is no formal adoption of one of the tests applied in other 
jurisdictions.    
Given the above considerations, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
should adopt the 2003 version of the ABA Model Rule as modified above.  
The scope of the rule should not exceed the limited purpose to protect the 
attorney-client relationship.  To shield the corporation from any contact or 
to allow too much contact would defeat the purpose of the rule.  The rule 
adopted by the New Hampshire Supreme Court should be narrowly tai-
lored to only protect the attorney-client relationship and should also con-
sider the attorneys’ need for clear guidance.   
 
